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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have gained 
popularity in recent years. This is because they have great 
potential to provide a promising infrastructure for 
numerous applications. The rapid deployment and 
reduction in cost of broadband internet connectivity has 
made it affordable to have these networks exchange and 
manage information over the public network. To use 
conventional security architectures in this regard pose a 
major challenge since available cryptographic algorithms 
are computationally intensive. On the other hand WSN 
nodes are resource constrained in terms of computational 
power, storage memory, communication bandwidth, and 
battery power/energy. However the energy constraint of 
all is very crucial and needs to be addressed since WSN 
nodes are typically power limited. The performance of 
WSNs can be improved by introducing powerful 
processors with large memory capacities and high 
bandwidth radio technologies demanding additional 
energy requirements. It is well known that communication 
overheads consume more energy than performing 
cryptographic computations. Thus additional control 
overheads introduced on top of the data plane by 
cryptographic mechanisms come at a huge cost. This 
paper provides an overview of existing cryptographic 
mechanisms applicable to WSNs along with their energy 
requirements, strengths and weaknesses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
WSNs have always been designed to implement only the 
requirements of a dedicated function, which is why they 
have always retained their traditional small form factor 
and have always had limited resources in terms of 
computational power, storage memory, communication 
bandwidth and battery power. It is because of these 
features that their costs have been greatly reduced making 
them effectively inexpensive. 
An attempt to enhance their resources by employing more 
powerful processors, large memory capacities and high 
bandwidth radio technologies effectively result in bulky 
sensor nodes with increased power requirements. This in 
turn defeats the purpose for which these devices were 
initially designed because it introduces a considerable 
investment for a device which should relatively be of low 
cost. 
Broadband internet connectivity has rapidly become 
cheap and ubiquitous, and as a result it has become very 
affordable for a lot of electronic devices to use the public 
network (internet) to send their information. The number 
of devices connected to the internet exceeded the number 
of people on earth in 2008/2009, while in 2010 the ratio 
of connected devices per person was 1.84:1  [1], [2]. Due 
to this exponential growth, CISCO now estimates that by 
2020 at least 20 billion devices will be connected to the 
internet [1]–[3]. 
This new technological paradigm is referred to as the 
“Internet of Things” (IoT). Authors in [1], [2] describe the 
IoT as a system where items in our physical world are 
equipped with sensors that allow them to connect to the 
internet through wired or wireless means. Such an 
implementation results in a global network of smart 
objects equipped with embedded electronics, software and 
connectivity which enables them to exchange data 
through the public network. 
As we connect more of these devices to the internet, it is 
very important to simultaneously implement reliable 
security architectures. 
WSNs play a major role in this new technological 
revolution due to their numerous applications [4], [5]. 
These networks are made up of two main components 
namely node and base station/sink. The node is an 
autonomous device normally equipped with sensors that 
perform a collaborative measurement process. The base 
station captures and processes all the data from the nodes 
and sometimes provides gateway services to communicate 
with the public network [6].  
Figure 1 shows the IoT enabled WSN architecture. The 
key component is the WSN node. It is equipped with 
sensing, processing and communication capabilities to 
monitor the parameters of the intended application. Figure 
2 shows a typical WSN node architecture. Nodes are 
typically powered with batteries hence making energy 
consumption an issue to take into account when 
implementing such networks [4]. 
 
Figure 1: Wireless Sensor Network Architecture [7] 
 
 
Figure 2: WSN Node [7] 
 
2. WSN Constraints and Security Issues 
 
WSNs face a lot of security challenges due to the nature 
of their deployment. They are normally distributed and 
deployed in remote areas where they are left unattended, 
making them vulnerable to physical attacks such as node 
capture and tampering [4], [8]. The implementation of 
reliable security mechanisms to counteract such attacks is 
an aspect of prime significance. 
Since the inception of the IoT, it has become affordable 
for WSNs to send and receive data over the public 
network, but this makes them vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
The implementation of conventional cryptographic 
algorithms is a very complex and computationally 
intensive process. Employing these algorithms in WSNs 
is a huge challenge since WSN nodes have limitations in 
terms of computational power, storage memory, 
communication bandwidth, and battery power/energy [4], 
[8]–[13]. 
The biggest constraint in WSNs is energy. Work in [4] 
suggests that energy consumption in WSN nodes can be 
divided into three categories: (i) consumption by the 
sensor transducer (to convert the physical quantities being 
measured to electrical/electronic signals); (ii) 
consumption by the communication module 
(ZigBee/Lora/GSM etc.); and (iii) consumption during 
microprocessor computation. 
Authors of [14], [15] found that communication is more 
energy consuming than cryptographic computation, 
therefore message expansion as result of additional 
information overheads introduced by cryptographic 
algorithms come at a huge cost. Furthermore, the 
implementation of enhanced security architectures leads 
to more power consumption on the computation of 
cryptographic functions. This implies that high level 
security mechanisms introduce large communication and 
computation overheads which then lead to high energy 
consumption. 
3. General Security Requirements for WSNs 
 
The main goal behind implementing security in WSNs is 
to protect the data that is being transmitted through the 
network as well as the network resources against potential 
attacks. In order to optimize conventional security 
architectures for a given application, it is always essential 
to be aware of the security requirements for that particular 
application as it is the one that ultimately determines the 
type of security architecture to be employed. The authors 
of [4], [8] categorize common security requirements for 
WSNs as described below: 
Authentication: This is required to verify that the 
communicating nodes are exactly who they claim to be 
[4], [8]. It is very important for WSN nodes to have a 
mechanism to confirm that the data they receive is indeed 
from the actual trusted sender nodes. To encrypt data 
without first being able to authenticate communicating 
nodes is quite meaningless. 
Confidentiality: This ensures that messages sent through 
the network are unintelligible to all but the intended 
recipient node [4], [16]. This maintains information 
secrecy within the network. 
Data Integrity: It ensures that the data received was not 
altered or manipulated while in route from the source 
node to the destination node [4].  
Data Freshness: This ensures that the data received is 
recent and not a replay of an old message [14]. 
Availability: This is meant to ensure that the services of a 
WSN are always available and can be accessed even 
during an attack [17]. 
Self-organization: It is essential for each node in a WSN 
to be able to self-organize and self-heal. This poses a 
challenge as it brings about the necessity for pre-key 
distribution schemes to be employed [4]. 
Secure localization: This is required to securely get 
accurate locations of sensor nodes in a WSN [4]. 
Time synchronization: Security mechanisms for WSNs 
need to be time synchronized [4]. 
 
Various WSN applications normally focus on the 
implementation of different security requirements 
depending on the required security level, but the most 
common are authentication, confidentiality, data integrity 
and availability. 
4. Security Attacks in WSNs 
 
Security attacks affect a network’s capability and capacity 
to perform its expected functions. It is imperative to 
conduct a careful analysis of the various types of WSN 
attacks in order to deduce possible countermeasures that 
can prevent or minimize the associated effects. Authors of 
[4] categorise WSN attacks into three groups: (i) attacks 
on authentication and confidentiality; (ii) attacks on 
service integrity; and (iii) attacks on network availability. 
Table 1 is a summary of the most common WSN attacks 
and their known countermeasures. Authors of [4], [8] 
suggest that denial of service (DoS) attacks can be 
analyzed effectively by classifying them according to the 
layered network model. This approach identifies security 
issues that each layer is susceptible to, and also allows 
further analysis into attacks that can exploit the 
interactions of the layers. Security attacks have a serious 
impact on network performance and if left unattended 
they may even render the network useless. It becomes less 
of a challenge to propose effective security mechanisms 
for WSN applications once security requirements and 
associated security attacks have been identified and 
thoroughly analyzed. 
Table 1: Common WSN attacks and Associated Countermeasures as stated in [4], [8], [17], [26] 
Attack Category Types of Attacks Possible Countermeasures 
1. Attacks on authentication 
and confidentiality 
Eavesdropping, Traffic analysis, 
Modification or spoofing of packets and 
Packet replay attacks 
Encryption and Authentication 
2. Attacks on service 
integrity 
Compromised node used to feed the 
network with false data values 
Encryption, Hashing algorithms and 
Authentication 
3. Attacks on Network 
Availability (DoS) 
  
 Physical layer  Jamming Spread spectrum and frequency hopping, 
low duty cycles 
Tampering Tamper proof circuits and hardware 
enclosures 
 Data link layer Collisions, unfair resource allocation 
and resource exhaustion 
Error correction coding, Time division 
multiplexing, Rate limiting MAC 
admission control 
 Network layer Spoofed routing information, selective 
forwarding, Sinkhole, Sybil, Wormhole, 
Hello Flood 
Encryption, Authentication and Multipath 
routing 
 
 
5. Cryptographic Mechanisms for WSNs 
 
Authors of [18] define cryptography as the science of 
secret writing which is achieved through encryption. 
Decryption is the process of data recovery in 
cryptography. 
A careful analysis and selection of the right cryptographic 
mechanisms is fundamental to successful implementation 
of optimized security architectures for WSN applications. 
Most of the security services such as authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation are normally 
ensured through the use of various forms of cryptography 
and incorporating them into already existing but 
simplified security protocols. The authors of [4], [8], [14], 
[19] highlight the importance of evaluating cryptographic 
algorithms with respect to storage size, operation speed, 
data size and power consumption as a way of determining 
their relative efficiencies. An algorithm’s efficiency can 
further be evaluated by taking into account the security 
requirements of the intended application and the 
characteristic features (processing power, memory and 
communication bandwidth) of a particular node under 
consideration. 
5.1 Evaluation of Symmetric Key Cryptography 
 
Symmetric key cryptography uses the same key for both 
encryption and decryption. Authors of [14] analyzed three 
symmetric key algorithms; AES (Rijndael), RC5 and 
RC6, and compared their energy consumption and 
memory requirements on a Mica2 sensor mote. RC5 
shows to be the most memory efficient, followed by RC6 
and lastly AES. AES outperforms both RC5 and RC6 
with regard to power consumption associated with the 
computation of the cryptographic algorithms. Memory 
efficiency has an impact on energy consumption because 
energy is required to store data. However, computational 
efficiency has far more significant energy cost 
implications as compared to memory efficiency. Hence 
the overall results show AES to be the most energy-
efficient symmetric cryptographic algorithm of the three. 
Authors of [20] conducted similar work where they 
compared and evaluated the energy consumption of three 
symmetric key algorithms (RC4, RC5 and IDEA) and two 
message digest/hash algorithms (SHA1 and MD5). 
Experiments conducted were based on measuring 
computational overheads of the respective algorithms on 6 
different microcontroller platforms (Atmega 103, Atmega 
128, SA-1110, UltraSparc2, M16C/10 and PXA250). The 
experiments indicated mostly uniform computational 
costs for the encryption algorithms, and it was also 
observed that RC4 outperforms its successor algorithm, 
RC5, in low end processors. Hashing algorithms (SHA1 
and MD5) were observed to incur higher computational 
overheads than cryptographic algorithms. Authors of [21] 
evaluated the power consumption of encryption 
algorithms (RC5, RC6, SkipJack, TEA and DES) on 
Crossbow MICA2 sensor motes using TinySec. The 
experiments took into account computational, 
communication and memory implications on power 
consumption. Their results showed that SkipJack and RC5 
have better energy performance in WSNs, but SkipJack 
however consumes more energy than RC5. Authors of 
[22] compared the performance of AES and XXTEA to 
the default TinySec algorithm, SkipJack, on MICA2 
motes. Performance was evaluated based on CPU cycles, 
throughput and power consumption, and experiments 
showed XXTEA algorithm to be the most optimum for 
WSNs. Authors of [23] studied and evaluated six block 
ciphers (RC5, RC6, Rijndael, MISTY1, KASUMI and 
Camellia) that according to literature are suitable 
candidates for WSN applications. Experiments were 
conducted on a 16-bit Texas Instruments microcontroller 
MSP430F149, and the evaluation criterion took into 
account security properties, memory and energy 
efficiency of the selected algorithms. Results showed 
Rijndael to be the best for high security and energy 
efficiency and MISTY1 showed better performance in 
storage and memory efficiency. Table 2 compares some 
of the most common WSN symmetric ciphers by energy 
efficiency on aspects of storage memory, processing 
speed and communication. 
Table 2: Ranking of symmetric ciphers by memory, processing and communication efficiency as evaluated from [21], [23] 
Rank Performance by 
memory 
efficiency (ROM) 
Performance by 
memory 
efficiency (RAM) 
Performance by 
processing 
efficiency 
Performance by 
message throughput 
(with authentication 
and encryption) 
Performance by 
communication latency 
(with authentication and 
encryption) 
1 SkipJack, TEA Rijndael Rijndael, RC5 SkipJack, RC5 RC5 
2 DES RC5, RC6, TEA SkipJack TEA SkipJack 
3 RC5, RC6 SkipJack TEA  TEA 
4 Rijndael  RC6   
5  DES DES   
 
 
5.1 Evaluation of Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
 
Asymmetric cryptography is based on the use of two keys 
that are mathematically related, one for encryption and the 
other for decryption. The key pair is comprised of the 
private and the public key. Each user has both keys, but 
the private key remains a secret while the public key is 
revealed to all other users. Asymmetric cryptography 
incurs more computational overheads than symmetric 
cryptography, but however simplifies the process of key 
distribution and management as compared to symmetric 
cryptography. This implies that asymmetric crypto-
systems are best suited for authentication and key 
exchange services. According to [24], it costs 42mJ of 
energy to encrypt a 1024-bit block on a MC68328 
DragonBall processor using RSA, while the encryption 
process of a 128-bit AES block is estimated to consume 
much less at 0.104mJ. 
In work [11], authors investigated and compared the 
energy cost implications of authentication and key 
exchange for two asymmetric algorithms RSA and ECC. 
Experiments were performed on an 8-bit Atmel ATmega 
128L low power microcontroller. Results show that ECC 
has much better energy costs than RSA in both 
authentication and key exchange processes. A similar 
experiment was simulated in [25] to compare the energy 
efficiency of ECC and RSA on MICA2DOT motes, and 
the same results were obtained showing ECC as the better 
choice of asymmetric cryptography for resource 
constrained environments. 
6. Conclusion 
 
There exists no generic security solution for all WSNs. 
Appropriate security architectures for WSNs greatly 
depend on the security requirements of particular WSN 
applications and hardware limitations of the type nodes 
being employed. 
Among the reviewed symmetric block ciphers, Rijndael 
appears to be the most energy efficient and sufficiently 
secure algorithm. Among the reviewed asymmetric block 
ciphers, ECC has shown much better energy performance 
while offering the same level of security as the most 
commonly employed asymmetric algorithm RSA.  
Selecting the right algorithm highly depends on 
determining the most efficient, in terms of computation, 
memory and energy, and sufficiently secure for a given 
application. 
This paper provides an overview of the energy 
requirements of cryptographic algorithms when employed 
in WSNs. This involved performing an evaluation of the 
most commonly used symmetric and asymmetric 
algorithms based on published literature, and developing 
ranking model based on computational, memory and 
bandwidth efficiency. 
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